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Global imbalances and the emergence of Asia 
Palle S Andersen and Karen Johnson
1 
Introduction 
Several interrelated factors appear to explain the significant build-up of global current 
account imbalances seen over the past four to five years. Faster GDP growth in the United 
States than in its trading partners – more recently sustained by a marked deterioration in the 
US fiscal position – along with an appreciating US dollar, contributed to much more rapid 
growth of US imports than of exports. Those external imbalances are generally expected to 
remain large. According to IMF projections, even if all countries were to grow at their 
potential and current exchange rates were maintained, US net foreign liabilities would 
increase from around 25% of GDP today to above 40% in 2008.  
The world has also witnessed rapid export-led growth in emerging Asia and the increased 
integration of these countries (notably China and India) into the global economy. At present, 
both China and India have small current account surpluses. Any future change is hard to 
predict. Continued rapid expansion of their exports could result in growth paths with large 
external surpluses; alternatively, high growth facilitated by continuing capital inflows could 
give rise to sizeable current account deficits in China and India. Whatever the outcome, the 
increased supply of low-cost goods and services from China and India will surely entail 
significant changes in global patterns of production, trade and relative prices.  
The combined challenge of adjusting external imbalances and integrating emerging Asia into 
the global economy is the principal subject of this paper. Two adjustment processes are at 
play. The first concerns the correction of global imbalances; the second involves the pressures 
that would arise even if trade were perfectly balanced. Given the potentially very large impact 
of China and India, their further integration into the global economy and the policies they 
choose will raise some additional challenges for adjusting global imbalances smoothly. 
Likewise, the need for deficit countries to shift resources into the production of tradables could 
complicate a successful integration of China and India into the global economy.  
This paper attempts to analyse these processes by first examining the widening of the US 
current account deficit from complementary analytical perspectives and documenting changes 
in the financing of the deficit in terms of financial instruments, investor type and investor 
residence. It also notes the implications of these changes for international investment positions. 
The paper then reviews elements of the growth strategy pursued by most Asian countries, 
including their exchange rate regimes and reserve management. To a large extent, that 
strategy resembles the dollar-oriented, export-led strategy adopted by western Europe and 
Japan in the 1950s and 1960s and later by the Asian newly industrialised economies (NIEs – 
Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (China)). Yet the export-led growth model 
does not adequately describe the growth strategies of China and India because strong import 
demand has kept their current account surpluses small. Nevertheless, the sheer size of 
China and India means that the global economy is facing a potential adjustment challenge of 
an entirely different order of magnitude. In addition, because the adjustment process is likely 
to be uneven, it may be accompanied by economic and political tensions among those 
countries’ trading partners.  
                                                  
1  This paper was written for the BIS in May 2004. It benefited from comments and suggestions from 
Bruno  Tissot and Bill White as well as former colleagues in several central banks, in particular 
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Next, the paper addresses key aspects of adjustment to these two challenges. First is the 
need for real economic adjustment over the medium term posed by the emergence of Asia. 
Next are issues related to the adjustment of external imbalances and global financial 
positions, including policies with respect to exchange rate and reserve management. 
Moreover, meeting the two global challenges more or less simultaneously presents special 
complexities that might make it more difficult to frame and implement sound policies.  
Last, the paper addresses possible policies to facilitate adjustment. These approaches, on 
which views differ widely across countries, include fiscal, monetary and exchange rate 
policies as well as structural policies. 
1.  Global imbalances: how did we get to the present situation? 
Current account imbalances have widened considerably over the past several years and are 
likely to persist over the medium term. Between the mid-1990s and 2003, the US current 
account deficit as a percentage of GDP more than tripled to about 5% (Table 1). Led by the 
NIEs, emerging Asian economies have witnessed a sizeable increase in their surplus 
positions, and Latin America and Russia have moved from deficit to surplus over this period. 
Most of these current account positions are projected to remain broadly unchanged or to 
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United  States  –136 –210 –297 –413 –386 –474 –531 –4.8  –395  –3.2 
Euro area  96  66  27  –30  10  58  29  0.4  –66  –1.1 
Japan 97  119  115  119  88  113  135  3.1  38  0.9 
Other industrial-
ised countries  15  –2  –13  34  33  32  24  0.6  9  0.4 
Emerging  Asia  25  117  119  91 88  130 165  0.9 140 1.5 
China   37  31  21  21  17  35  46  3.3  9  –0.8 
Hong Kong SAR  –6  2  9  6  6  12  14  8.7  20  12.1 
India    –3 –7 –3 –4  0  5  4  0.8  7  1.5 
Korea –8  40  24  12  8  6  12  2.4  20  4.1 
Singapore 15  18  22  16  16  19  28  30.8  13  15.2 
Taiwan, China   7  3  8  9  18  26  29  10.2  22  7.7 
Other Asia  –17  29  38  32  22  26  32  5.9  48  9.0 
Latin  America  –67 –91 –57  –47 –55 –16  4  0.2  71  3.5 
Transition 
economies –25  –30  –2  25  13  10  10  0.9  35  3.7 
Rest of the world  –4  –52  –19  59  48  44  54  3.6  58  3.5 
Total
1  1  –82 –126 –161  –161 –103  –110  –0.3  –111  –0.4 
1  Includes errors, omissions and asymmetries in balance of payments statistics as well as data for international 
organisations and a few smaller countries.  




Trade-flow determinants in the G3 economies 
Annual averages 





















Relative cyclical position (lhs)
2








































1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
1  As a percentage of GDP.    
2  Defined as the weighted average of real GDP in the 10 largest trading partners
relative to the domestic economy’s GDP; an increase represents a (relatively) slower rate of growth in the
domestic economy which should lead to an improvement in its current account balance.    
3  IMF index using 
relative unit labour costs; an increase represents a real depreciation of the currency. 
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Meanwhile, the balances of the major advanced economies other than the United States 
have remained in relatively stable surplus. Japan’s surplus has remained sizeable while that 
of the euro area has been small. Nonetheless, because the US deficit has expanded so 
much, the combined surplus of the other major advanced economies is now equivalent to 
less than half the US deficit – in contrast to the mid-1990s, when it exceeded the US deficit. 
One reason for this discrepancy is that 30% of the deterioration in the US current account 
balance since 1997 is not matched by higher measured surpluses in other countries because 
of widening (but unknown) measurement errors. 
The discussion below presents factors underlying the evolution of these imbalances from 
complementary analytical perspectives. 
A trade flow perspective 
Graph 1 shows that most of the marked widening in the US current account deficit since 
1991 can be attributed to three factors: faster GDP growth in the United States than in other 
advanced economies; asymmetric income elasticities for US exports and imports; and the 
lagged impact of the sharp real appreciation of the dollar (by about 50% in real effective 
terms between April 1995 and February 2002). The considerably slower growth in both 
Japan and the euro area relative to the United States during the 1990s tended to improve 
their current account balances. Indeed, even if the US economy had been growing at the 
same rate as the rest of the world, its current account would still have tended to deteriorate 
because the income elasticity associated with US imports is apparently much larger than that 
associated with US exports.
2 In the euro area, the rise in the current account surplus due to 
weak relative growth was reinforced by the depreciation of the euro against the dollar (about 
30% between February 1999 and October 2000).  
A savings-investment perspective 
The marked rise in the external borrowing needs of the United States (the financial 
counterpart of the current account deficit) can be divided into two periods: 1997–2000 and 
2001–03. Over the 1997–2000 period, the rise in borrowing reflected mainly a substantial 
increase of investment that was accompanied by a significant, sustained rise in productivity 
and improved longer-term growth prospects for the US economy. This phase also saw a 
significant fiscal consolidation and a marked increase in US public saving (Graph 2), both of 
which were helped by stronger real growth and higher asset prices. However, domestic 
absorption rose as saving by households and corporations fell. The decline in saving 
reflected the sharp increase in net wealth as well as increased consumption in anticipation of 
higher longer-term income growth. Although the stock of overall savings rose, it was not 
sufficient to finance the increase in investment. 
                                                  
2   Estimates of income elasticities for US imports have typically been between 1.5 and 2.5, while those for 




US current account and domestic saving-investment balances 

















Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
During the second period, 2001–03, US investment fell sharply. At the same time, tax 
reductions and increased government expenditure led to a significant decline in public saving 
that was only partly offset by higher private saving.
3 The latter apparently reflected, in part, a 
rise in business sector saving and some unwinding of the earlier wealth effect, as the decline 
in equity prices led to a reassessment of households’ future income expectations. 
Nonetheless, the overall decline in US saving was sufficiently large that US net foreign 
borrowing increased further. 
Conversely, the gap between saving and investment in many Asian countries is large and 
positive (Graph 3), a manifestation of their export-led growth strategies and their high 
propensity to save. In Japan, the ratio of private investment to GDP declined following the 
bursting of the “bubble” in the early 1990s as firms attempted to improve their balance 
sheets. However, the saving/GDP ratio also declined owing to growing fiscal deficits and a 
sharp fall in household saving. In the NIEs and ASEAN, investment/GDP ratios dropped after 
the currency crisis in 1997. They have remained at levels below those of recent decades, 
while saving ratios have posted smaller declines due to credit-induced and temporary 
increases in consumption. In contrast, the saving ratio in China (the highest in the region, 
partly because of rising job insecurity and reform of the social welfare system) has generated 
a relatively modest current account surplus, since investment has been a main engine of 
economic growth. 
A capital flow perspective 
Striking changes in the pattern of capital inflows have accompanied the widening of the US 
current account deficit. The changes have appeared in the instruments involved as well as in 
the geographical and investor composition of the flows. 
                                                  
3   Following a pattern seen in the mid-1980s, the simultaneous occurrence of large fiscal and current account 
deficits is often referred to as a “twin deficit” problem. Fiscal imbalances have frequently been observed in 
past experiences of widening current account deficits. However, somewhat surprisingly, fiscal consolidation 




Saving and investment balances in east Asian economies 
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1  For Hong Kong SAR prior to 1998, based on the saving-investment balance. For some economies in 2003, 
estimated from consensus forecasts (May 2004). 
Source: National data.
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Net foreign capital inflows into the United States in the form of direct and portfolio equity 
investment increased from a negligible amount in 1997 to the equivalent of about 2.5% of 
nominal GDP in 2000 (Table 2). These inflows were attracted by positive productivity 
developments and contributed to the large real effective appreciation of the dollar. After 
2000, a retrenchment in direct and portfolio equity inflows suggests that investors 
reassessed the longer-term profitability of US firms relative to earlier expectations. At the 
same time, US capital outflows diminished, and capital inflows associated with purchases of 
US government and corporate debt securities increased substantially (Graph 4). But whether 
these developments are problematic should be assessed in the light of the central, 
international role of the dollar and the low servicing burden, to date, of the external debt. 
 
Table 2 
United States: financial and capital accounts
1 
As a percentage of nominal GDP 
Financial account   















1997 2.7  0.0  0.1  2.3  0.2  –1.0 
1998 0.9  0.4  –0.6  1.4  –0.3  1.5 
1999 2.6  0.7  0.0  1.3  0.6  0.7 
2000 4.9  1.7  0.9  1.9  0.4  –0.6 
2001 4.1  0.2  0.1  3.5  0.2  –0.3 
2002   5.4  –0.6  0.4  4.6  1.1  –0.9 
2003  5.0  –1.2 –0.6  4.5  2.3 –0.1 
1  A positive (negative) sign represents an inflow (outflow) of capital.  
Source: National data. 
 
In terms of investor type, official reserve flows from foreign authorities (notably in Asia) have 
become an increasingly important source of financing for the US current account deficit over 
the past three years. Negligible in 2000–01, foreign official reserve flows (as identified in the 
US balance of payments statistics) accounted for almost 20% of net US capital inflows in 
2002. In 2003, their share rose to just below 45% of net inflows. 
Regarding geographical source, the share of euro area investors in net long-term portfolio 
flows to the United States shrank to just 1% in 2002, with a slight rebound in 2003 (Table 3). 
Combining official and private flows, the share of net long-term portfolio flows to the United 
States originating from Asia increased to 40% in 2003. That share might actually understate 
the relative importance of Asian investors, as it refers only to the direct source from which the 
investment is made. Alternative estimates suggest that the share of the US current account 




Net capital flows to and from the United States:  
composition by financial instrument 













1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Foreign official investors
FDI and equity portfolio inflows
Private bonds and other inflows
Total financial flows
Current account balance (rhs)
Note: The difference between the current account balance (shown on an inverted scale) and total financial flows
equals the capital account balance plus the errors and omissions. 




Net foreign long-term portfolio flows to the United States: 
breakdown by instrument and region or country of purchase 
In per cent 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total inflows    
Asia  11.0 22.0 23.0 32.0 37.0 40.0 
Japan  7.0 12.0 11.0 11.0 17.0 24.0 
Euro  area  24.0 15.0 23.0  8.0  1.0  5.0 
United  Kingdom  50.0 37.0 36.0 35.0 34.0 22.0 
Caribbean centres  –1.4  5.9  –0.3  10.9  13.6  10.3 
Others  16.4 20.1 18.3 14.1 14.4 22.7 
US government 
bonds        
Asia  40.0  77.0 61.0 64.0 49.0 60.0 
Japan  25.0  53.0 59.0 39.0 34.0 43.0 
Euro area  16.0  –5.0  10.0  –7.0  –4.0  2.0 
United Kingdom  44.0  –8.0  –4.0  20.0  30.0  13.0 
Caribbean Centres  –12.1  10.7 6.4 7.7  17.8 7.0 
Others 12.1  25.3  26.6 15.3  7.2 18.0 
Source: US Treasury.  BIS Papers No 50  35
 
 
International investment positions 
The capital inflows that are the counterparts of the persistent US current account deficits 
have cumulated to a net international liability position which, at 25% of GDP at the end of 
2002, is large by historical standards (Graph 5).
4 The rise in US foreign debt has occurred 
during a period when financial sectors around the globe have been liberalised and 
international ownership of capital stocks has increased. Given the large amount of US assets 
now owned by foreigners (approximately $9 trillion), changes in the dollar’s value could have 
far-reaching implications for balance sheets and economic performance. 
Graph 5 
US net international investment position and net investment income 
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Net international investment position (lhs)
1
Net investment income (rhs)
1  Year-end data, at market value; shown for the following year. 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
2.  The emergence of Asia: new challenges 
Growth trends and strategy 
Led by exports, the growth rates of Asia’s emerging market economies have been 
exceptionally high in recent years (Table 4). In China and India, for instance, the growth of 
real GDP has averaged 9.2% and 5.5%, respectively, since the early 1990s. The integration 
of emerging Asia’s trade with the global economy has also proceeded at a rapid pace: its 
share of global exports increased from 13.5% in 1990 to 20% in 2002 despite an 
approximate doubling in total world export volumes. The increasing penetration in global 
                                                  
4   At the end of the 19th century, when the United States was “an emerging economic giant”, its net international 
liability position never exceeded 26% of GDP. See M Obstfeld and K Rogoff, “Perspectives on OECD 
economic integration: implications for US current account adjustment”, paper presented at the economic 
symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 2000. Net 
international investment positions also reflect changes in exchange rates. Some 30% of the deterioration in 
the US net investment position between 1999 and 2002 is attributable to changes in the US dollar value of 
foreign assets as the dollar appreciated. See C Tille, “The impact of exchange rate movements on US foreign 
debt”, Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, January 2003. 36  BIS Papers No 50
 
 
goods markets has been particularly pronounced in the case of China, which more than 
doubled its share in global merchandise exports to nearly 8% in 2003, thereby becoming the 
world’s fourth largest exporting nation. In addition, China is an important source of global 
demand, having become the world’s second largest consumer of oil and fourth largest 




Average annual growth rate of selected variables (in per cent) 
Real GDP  Per capita real 



















China    9.2 7.6 8.1 6.9  16.7  15.7  2.2  1.2 
Hong Kong SAR  3.8  3.6  2.5 2.6  8.0 6.5  1.8  1.5 
India  5.5 5.3 3.5 3.5 10.7  12.8 0.7  0.7 
Korea  6.0 6.4 5.0 5.5  13.4  12.4  1.8  2.5 
Malaysia  6.4 4.7 3.7 2.2  9.8 5.6  3.1  2.7 
Singapore  6.2 2.5 3.4 0.4  10.7 5.0  2.8  1.9 
Taiwan,  China  5.3 3.1 4.3 2.2  7.2 7.4  1.1  0.6 
Thailand  5.0 4.3 3.9 3.3  9.6 7.8  1.1  2.3 
United States  2.8  2.6  1.6 1.5  5.2 1.3  1.2  1.1 
Euro area  1.9  1.8  1.5  1.5 5.6 4.1  1.0 1.1 
Japan  1.6 1.1 1.3 0.9  4.4 4.7  0.2  –0.6 
World  3.2 3.4 2.1 2.5  5.9 4.7  N/A N/A 
Sources: IMF; national data. 
 
Intraregional trade has also become more important in Asia (Table 5). In 2002, it accounted 
for more than 40% of the region’s total trade and was one of the main sources of export 
growth. Between 1990 and 2002, exports to China accounted for about 90% of export growth 
in Taiwan (China), 70% in Japan and 40% in Korea. The rapid increase in regional exports to 
China is partly explained by its expanding role as an intermediary for regional exports 
destined for the United States and other developed countries. But it is also due to the strong 
growth of domestic investment among some of China's regional trade partners. To cut costs, 
the more industrialised countries in the region are increasingly shifting the low-skilled and 
labour-intensive stages of their production processes to China while concentrating their own 
output on the more skilled and capital-intensive parts. That shift is causing China to run 
rapidly growing trade deficits with those countries and an expanding trade surplus with the 
United States. Regarding India, the English speaking world has found that it can outsource 
services to that country at significant cost savings, and India’s share of global services trade 




Indicators of trade integration in Asia 
In per cent 
  Asian exports/global exports  Intraregional exports/total exports 
  1990 1998 2002 1990 1998 2002 
Japan 8.5  7.2  6.5  31.3  34.9  43.2 
China   1.9  3.4  5.1  53.5  34.5  34.0 
Hong Kong SAR  2.4  3.2  3.1  40.7  45.4  51.4 
India 0.5  0.6  0.8  12.1  19.6  23.3 
Korea 2.0  2.5  2.5  16.8  34.0  38.4 
Malaysia 0.9  1.4  1.5  44.6  42.3  47.5 
Thailand 0.7  1.0  1.1  22.1  33.3  36.8 
Total region
1  22.0 25.5 26.7 32.4 36.8 41.7 
1  IMF definition of Asia plus Japan (includes countries not mentioned above). 





Structure of the balance of payments 
Accumulated figures for 1998–2003, in billions of US dollars 

















China   108.5  144.1  211.6  –53.0  –14.3  –10.8  –241.9 
Hong Kong SAR  73.0  –62.8  9.8 –44.6 –19.2  4.3  –14.4 
India –1.1  53.8  17.5  10.3 25.5  –0.9 –51.9 
Korea 59.2  24.5  4.1  24.8  –1.6  2.7  –86.4 
Malaysia 43.9  –22.4  7.0  –5.6  –23.9  –7.2  –14.3 
Taiwan, China  85.4  6.5  –8.9  –4.7  21.6  2.0  –93.9 
Thailand 42.6  –32.7  14.2  –4.4  –45.5  –0.3  –9.5 
Japan 555.8  –359.7  –121.4  –259.3  63.9  23.5  –234.6 
1  The four capital and financial account categories may not sum to zero because of deviations and rounding.   
2  A negative sign indicates an increase in reserves. 
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; authors’ calculations. 
 
Asian economies have also become increasingly integrated with global financial markets, but 
the development and integration of their local financial markets has been more limited. Some 
of the Asian economies receive relatively large net financial inflows (Table 6). Moreover, these 
net inflows mask important gross capital movements, as a significant share of domestic 38  BIS Papers No 50
 
 
saving is channelled into domestic investment via the foreign sector (“round-tripping”). In 
China, for example, significant portfolio and banking outflows are offset by large foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows. Particularly in China and India, that pattern of international capital 
flows seems to reflect the relatively fragile state of their domestic financial systems, which 
cannot efficiently allocate saving to domestic investment. While more than 60% of FDI flows in 
recent years have come from within the region, most of the non-FDI financial flows have 
reflected transactions with industrial economies outside the region.
5 
A number of factors underlie the trends described above: 
  In most emerging Asian economies, labour is relatively cheap, abundant and well 
qualified. With the exception of Singapore and Hong Kong SAR, real wages are far 
below those in industrial countries. Moreover, most of these economies have large 
unexploited supplies of labour, or rapidly growing populations, or both. Such conditions 
have resulted in rapid growth in employment as well as in levels of human capital. 
  Japan has been an important source of export-linked FDI capital and technological 
transfer for the region since the 1970s. Japan’s FDI outflows went first to Korea and 
Taiwan (China), then to the ASEAN-4 economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand), and more recently to China. Each round of sustained, 
effective appreciation of the yen since the 1970s was followed by a wave of 
outsourcing from Japanese firms to the region. 
  Growth is supported by relatively accommodative macroeconomic and exchange rate 
policies. Only a few economies (Korea and Thailand) have consolidated their fiscal 
position since the Asian crisis (Table 7). Most others have either run persistently large 
deficits (India) or significantly eased their fiscal policy stance over the past few years 
(Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan (China)). Because most countries also aim at maintaining 
a high degree of exchange rate stability vis-à-vis the dollar (and thus against the 
Chinese renminbi), the recent depreciation of the dollar against the euro and the yen 




General government balance as a percentage of GDP 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
China   –3.0  –4.0  –3.6  –3.2  –3.3  –3.2 
Hong Kong SAR  –1.8  0.8  –0.6  –5.0  –4.9  –6.3 
India –8.4  –9.7  –9.8  –10.4  –10.2  –10.3 
Korea –4.3  –3.3  1.3  0.6  2.7  0.8 
Malaysia –0.8  –2.9  –5.6  –5.0  –5.5  –5.3 
Singapore 0.7  3.8  3.6  1.7  1.3  –1.2 
Taiwan, China  –3.7  0.8  –4.5  –6.4  –6.0  –6.5 
Thailand –2.5  –3.5  –2.8  –2.9  –2.8  –0.8 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database. 
                                                  
5   In 2003, China experienced a marked rise in net short-term capital inflows, apparently because of an expected 
appreciation of the renminbi. BIS Papers No 50  39
 
 
Exchange rate policies and reserve accumulation 
In keeping with their export-led development strategy, the Asian authorities have conducted 
intervention purchases of foreign exchange to combat the appreciation of their currencies;
6 
as a consequence, they have accumulated quantities of reserves (Graph 6) that appear 
large relative to traditional benchmarks. The accumulation reflects several interrelated 
phenomena. First, the 1997–98 financial crisis convinced the Asian authorities to build up 
reserves large enough to deter speculation against their currencies. They also chose to hold 
such reserves in dollars, given the dollar’s status as the world’s anchor, reserve and 
intervention currency (see box). Second, while exchange rate regimes in the region became 
somewhat more flexible after the crisis, the export-led growth strategy has meant that the 
authorities continue to orient their exchange rate policies towards the dollar.
7 The form of the 
policies varies from hard pegs (Hong Kong SAR) to conventional fixed peg arrangements 
(China and Malaysia) to tightly managed floats (Korea and India). The large scale of 
intervention conducted by the Japanese authorities would seem to bring their exchange rate 
regime, in practice, close to a managed float. Third, in addition to maintaining 
competitiveness in their export sectors, the Asian authorities have been motivated to 
intervene by domestic concerns about deflationary pressures, weak financial sectors and 
limited market liquidity. 
Graph 6 
Main holders of foreign exchange reserves 

















JP CN TW XM KR HK IN SG RU MX BR CH MY TH US DK GB TR CA
December 2001
January 2004
BR = Brazil; CA = Canada; CH = Switzerland; CN = China; DK = Denmark; GB = United Kingdom;
HK = Hong Kong SAR; IN = India; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; RU = Russia; 
SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; TR = Turkey; TW = Taiwan, China; US = United States; XM = Euro area. 
Sources: IMF; national data. 
                                                  
6   It should be noted that China successfully resisted a depreciation of its currency after the 1997–98 crisis in 
Asia. 
7   During the first half of 2003, the United States accounted for about 26% of total exports from both Japan and 
China. Stable exchange rates against the dollar are thus seen as important in maintaining high growth. 40  BIS Papers No 50
 
 
3.  Adjustment challenges  
Real economic adjustment in the medium term 
General considerations: changes in trade and relative prices 
Real adjustment to the combined challenges will entail changes at many levels. This section 
concerns the necessary changes in trade, production, and relative prices associated with the 
emergence of the Asian economies. It also discusses the shifts of real resources between 
tradable and non-tradable sectors that are part of the adjustment needed to resolve external 
imbalances. 
 
Box: The Asian reserve build-up, the dollar and the euro 
The sheer size of dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves held by Asian countries has 
raised the question of whether those countries might shift a substantial part of their reserves from 
dollar- to euro-denominated assets. The question has become more pressing in the wake of the 
recent appreciation of the euro against the dollar. Widening interest rate differentials or a shift in 
the slope of yield curves might also induce reserve holders to diversify their reserve asset 
portfolio, with implications for bond prices. 
Available information suggests, however, that any shift in reserve holdings from the dollar to the 
euro has been small so far, especially for emerging market economies. From 2000 to 2002 (ie a 
period of gradual euro appreciation) the reserve build-up was largely in dollar-denominated 
assets. For example, in quantitative terms dollar-denominated reserve assets increased by SDR 
102 billion in 2002, while euro-denominated reserve assets rose by only SDR 34 billion (see table 
below). Moreover, Japanese interventions in the foreign exchange market almost exclusively 
involved the purchase of dollars. Preliminary data suggest that this trend continued into 2003. 
Changes in official foreign exchange reserves  
of US dollars and euros 
In billions of SDR 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 
US dollar      
Stocks outstanding  936.5 1,021.0  1,043.9 1,202.2 
Change in holdings  106.6  84.5  23.0  158.3 
Quantity change
1 60.4  54.3  102.0  262.7 
Price change
2 46.3  30.2  –79.1  –104.4 
Euro       
Stocks outstanding  229.1 255.1  316.6  371.2 
Change in holdings  74.8  26.0  61.5  54.6 
Quantity change
1 76.1  31.1 33.6 22.0 
Price change
2 –1.3  –5.1  27.9  32.6 
1  Figures excluding the effect of FX valuations have been estimated by converting stock data at end-period rates into euros 
and converting back into dollars at average-period exchange rates.    
2  Obtained by subtracting the quantity change from the 
total change in holdings. 
Sources: IMF; BIS calculations. 
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future. If resources in China and India are directed by market forces to industries in which 
they have a comparative advantage, global efficiency will increase. The rest of the world (as 
well as the populations in China and India) will therefore benefit from a large and positive 
supply shock. However, there is a short-term challenge: the rest of the world also needs to 
absorb part of the additional output and to adjust to the growth of exports of these countries. 
Such adjustment will probably entail changes in exchange rates, prices, wages, domestic 
production patterns, returns to capital and trade balances. The distribution of this adjustment 
across (and even within) countries might be uneven and cause short-term problems. 
Export-led growth strategies have been used before by countries recovering or in the early 
stages of development: western Europe and Japan in the 1950s and 1960s and, more 
recently, some of the economies of emerging Asia. Relative to those cases, however, the 
scale of the labour forces in China and India is the obvious difference, underlining concerns 
that, this time, the size of the global adjustment could be significantly greater. China and 
India have a combined population of well over 2 billion, representing more than a third of the 
world’s population. By contrast, when Japan was starting to emerge as an economic force in 
1960, it had only 3% of the world population; and in 1980, when the NIEs were in the early 
stages of their growth “miracle”, they had about 1.5% of the global population. 
In the long run, the positive supply shock associated with the integration of China and India 
into world markets means that the global economy should move to a higher and arguably 
more sustainable growth path. Over the short and medium term, however, the rest of the 
world must be prepared for the burden of adjustment. This may mean that countries should 
shift to producing more goods for the domestic market, or goods and services for which they 
have specific competitive advantages. In the short run, the adjustment may well entail 
significant economic costs as uncompetitive businesses in affected industries shut down and 
workers formerly employed by them search for new jobs. Spells of unemployment could last 
for considerable periods, particularly if job seekers must consider different types of 
employment or require significant retraining. In addition, because the emergence of China 
and India implies a sizeable increase in the world’s effective labour force and a consequent 
decrease in the world’s capital/labour ratio, some workers in the industrial countries may see 
their wages grow more slowly or even decline, while returns to capital are likely to increase. 
The shift in production to China and India will also have effects on prices of raw materials, 
manufactured goods and services. Given relatively fixed supplies of raw materials (at least in 
the short term), an expansion of output and demand as new supplies of labour are drawn into 
the international economy will put upward pressure on commodity prices.
8 The build-up of 
infrastructure in China and India that is associated with the shift in production to those 
countries would accentuate such pressure. That effect has already been seen in China, 
where rapid investment in infrastructure and certain industries has contributed to increases in 
prices of iron ore, copper and oil. Similarly, the increased shipment of raw materials to China 
has contributed to higher shipping rates. In the longer run, however, as infrastructure 
improves and bottlenecks are eliminated, some of the pressure on raw materials prices 
should recede.  
The story is different for output prices. Precisely because the shifting of production and 
resources will improve efficiency, the relative prices of output in sectors affected by the better 
allocation will fall. In general, the declines should benefit consumers. There is, however, a 
concern that manufacturing capacity might be added too quickly in China and create undue 
downward pressure on prices. More broadly, additional demand – for example from 
increasingly wealthy Chinese and Indian consumers or from consumers in the rest of the 
                                                  
8   Even if only temporary, the rise in commodity prices might lead to overinvestment in commodity-producing 
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world who see lower prices – might not match increases in supply. In that event, downward 
pressure on the prices of certain goods and services would signal problems, which market 
forces and, if necessary, appropriate policies would have to correct. 
Given the diversity of the world’s economies and their varied characteristics (trade surpluses 
versus deficits, large manufacturing sectors versus large raw materials or intermediate goods 
sectors, etc), it is impossible to know how adjustment will proceed everywhere. However, it 
must be stressed that temporary fluctuations in the income either of the United States or of 
its trading partners cannot be a source of lasting correction to external imbalances. 
Accordingly, any discussion of the adjustment of these imbalances needs to be couched in 
terms of growth at potential. To maintain full utilisation of resources throughout the global 
economy, domestic demand in individual countries (and regions more generally) would need 
to increase where external demand diminishes. Maintaining domestic demand at near full 
employment would ease the costly, but necessary, shifting of real resources from the 
production of tradables to non-tradables as well as help increase demand for goods and 
services produced abroad. 
Adjustments in the United States 
The US current account deficit has developed because total domestic demand has exceeded 
aggregate production over an extended period of time. For the deficit to narrow, US domestic 
absorption must fall relative to domestic production. In addition, to increase exports relative 
to imports, the composition of production at full capacity within the US economy must shift 
towards traded goods and services and away from home goods. That transition will not 
necessarily be accomplished entirely smoothly. On the demand side, both in the United 
States and in its trading partners, consumption must correspondingly shift towards goods 
and services produced in the United States relative to those produced in foreign countries. 
For all those shifts to occur and be sustained, relative prices must change to send the 
appropriate signals to consumers and producers in the United States as well as abroad.  
Adjustments in Asia 
The integration of China and India into the world economy also poses short-term challenges 
for other economies in Asia, many of which have followed (or are still following) export-led 
growth strategies. Some regional economies are already taking steps to adapt and take 
advantage of China’s growing economic presence. For example, manufacturing in Singapore 
has diversified away from electronics production and now includes a rapidly growing 
pharmaceuticals industry, and the high-tech sector in Taiwan (China) is increasingly shifting 
its focus from manufacturing to research and development. In the case of Japan, the 
adjustment would imply a continuation of the policies pursued by Japanese firms in response 
to the emergence of the NIEs. These changes will generally entail a decrease in the labour 
intensity of output in these economies, and the extent to which such shifts meet with 
difficulties can have noticeable macroeconomic consequences. 
It is not clear whether the adjustments discussed above would mean larger trade deficits or 
smaller trade surpluses in China and India. Standard economic theory suggests that 
economies in the early stages of development should finance investment by importing capital 
from the rest of the world. In fact, both China and India are receiving large capital inflows 
(Table 6). If countries have sufficient domestic saving, however, capital formation can occur 
without running a trade deficit. The high rate of domestic saving in China (more than 40% of 
GDP) could perhaps finance a rapid pace of investment growth without a trade deficit. That 
scenario would imply that imports in China and, to a lesser extent, India will rise along with 
their exports, leaving global imbalances unchanged. 
Alternatively, the trade patterns observed to date might continue, whereby China widens its 
trade surplus with the United States while running increasingly large trade deficits with 
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remain largely unchanged, but the United States would see a widening of its already large 
current account deficit matched by higher surpluses in Asia outside China.  
China and India need to strengthen their institutional and policy frameworks regardless of 
their impact on global imbalances. The challenges in this respect are particularly profound in 
China, where state-owned enterprises (SOEs) still play an important role and fundamental 
market mechanisms are not in place. Capital account liberalisation is a principal condition for 
moving towards the more flexible exchange rate regime announced by the authorities in 
China for the medium term. But to prevent capital account liberalisation from leading to 
massive capital outflows and downward pressure on the currency, two major issues need to 
be addressed. First, the state-owned banks need to strengthen their capital base as well as 
improve their corporate governance and their ability to intermediate capital. They might also 
have to reduce their vulnerability to exchange rate movements and the risk of Chinese 
residents shifting their deposits elsewhere.  
Second, lifting controls on capital outflows might prompt residents to substantially increase 
their holdings of foreign assets to obtain higher yields. Preventing such capital outflows 
would require deeper and politically much more difficult measures. In particular, one reason 
for the low rate of return on Chinese financial assets is the poor performance of large SOEs. 
Imposing a harder budget constraint on the SOEs would undoubtedly improve their 
profitability and reduce the misallocation of resources. But it would also create social 
tensions by increasing the already high rates of unemployment and underemployment. 
Recent measures (such as upgrading the status of private enterprises, making private 
property rights constitutionally inviolable, expanding investment in infrastructure and 
increasing fiscal support for the rural sector) are likely to widen the range of domestic 
investment opportunities and enhance the welfare of the rural population. Hence, they might 
help to slow the migration of rural workers until other sectors of the economy are able to 
absorb them.  
Financial market adjustment 
US net indebtedness has increased substantially in the past several years, raising questions 
about the capacity and willingness of investors to continue to absorb claims against the 
United States. At some point, the ratio of US net foreign debt to GDP must stabilise. The 
precise magnitude of the net foreign debt at which stabilisation would occur is not known, 
and it may be quite large in absolute value. As a consequence, the timing and pace of 
adjustment cannot be predicted with any confidence. However, the long-run limit to the 
growth of the US net debt position is likely to depend on two factors that might change over 
time: investors’ sentiment and their willingness to continue to absorb large quantities of US 
assets.  
The prominent international role of the dollar facilitates US access to financing in a way 
unmatched by any other country or region. To some extent, it also prevents dollar 
fluctuations from affecting the financing situation of the US public and private sectors. As 
long as the dollar continues to play its international role, the ongoing demand for international 
liquidity may also mean that many US liabilities to the rest of the world will not have to be 
redeemed. In practice, however, the demand for dollar assets could at some point be 
compromised if, for example, the creditworthiness of the US economy is seen as weakening 
or US inflation picks up or growth differentials vis-à-vis trading partners narrow or disappear.  
As noted earlier, Asian central banks (and other investors) continue to purchase US debt on 




9 In global capital markets, continued official purchases of US debt could 
contribute to low US bond yields and thus indirectly also stimulate equity prices and support 
household spending. The reserve build-up by Asian monetary authorities could continue, at 
least in the short to medium run, on the basis of a number of factors: 
  With the possible exception of China, inflationary pressures are still weak, and 
labour markets are exhibiting a good deal of slack. Japan, Hong Kong SAR, China 
and Taiwan (China) have recently experienced (or are still experiencing) deflation 
(Graph 7). It is also uncertain whether some export sectors are competitive enough 
to cope with the deflationary shock that would result from exchange rate 
appreciation. At this stage, the massive accumulation of foreign reserves, external 
stability and price stability could thus be regarded as mutually consistent. 
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Source: National data. 
  Asia authorities still practise risk-averse behaviours (ie to reduce the risk of 
disruptive financial market and exchange rate developments and shield weak 
financial institutions from such events).
10 Since internally based growth strategies 
have sometimes been associated with monetary or financial instability and, 
ultimately, a currency crisis, combining export-led growth with the accumulation of 
reserves can also be seen as contributing to reducing or averting risks. 
  Because it has been a successful catch-up strategy, export-led growth remains an 
overriding policy goal. As such, it seems to dwarf considerations related to portfolio 
diversification and the financial risk-return aspects of reserve accumulation. Neither 
dollar/euro exchange rate fluctuations nor interest rate and productivity differentials 
                                                  
9   As of March 2004, foreign central banks held about 25% of US marketable Treasury debt. In the event of a 
sharp fall in the dollar, some central banks might need an injection of public money to restore their capital. 
10   In its Report on Currency and Finance, 2002–03, the Reserve Bank of India characterised the build-up of 
reserves as a policy of “self-insurance” (p 188). The report also noted that “sharp exchange rate movements 
[of the rupee] can be highly disequilibrating and costly for the economy during periods of uncertainty or 
adverse expectations [...]. If the level of reserves is considered to be in the high comfort zone, it may be 
possible to attach larger weight to return on foreign exchange assets rather than on liquidity, thereby reducing 
net costs of holding reserves” (p 187). BIS Papers No 50  45
 
 
seem to have much influence on the currency composition of reserve portfolios held 
by Asian countries. 
  The increased integration of trade within Asia suggests an additional “lock-in” effect 
in favour of the dollar, as it has been the common monetary standard on which the 
integration has been built. An exchange rate appreciation for a single Asian country 
vis-à-vis the dollar would alter that country’s competitive position relative not only to 
the United States but also to its Asian partners. That multilateral effect suggests that 
any single country will be reluctant to allow its currency to appreciate unilaterally 
against the dollar. 
In the longer run, however, several factors suggest that purchases of US securities by Asian 
central banks will encounter limits:
11  
  A strong rise in domestic inflation or a credit boom associated with unsustainable 
debt positions might make Asian countries reconsider the appropriateness of their 
current exchange rate orientation. Indeed, that orientation would generate the real 
appreciation that the countries are currently attempting to avoid. Complete 
sterilisation of interventions by some of these countries is hampered by the 
underdeveloped condition of their financial markets. As a result, domestic interest 
rates will be lower and interest-sensitive spending higher than they otherwise would 
have been, leading to upward pressure on prices.   
  To the extent that monetary policy is devoted to nominal exchange rate objectives, 
there is less scope to counter shocks to aggregate demand more generally. Indeed, 
if monetary policy were needed to counter other shocks, the costs of maintaining a 
nominal exchange rate objective might become very large. 
  The buffer stock model for foreign reserves shows that they have reached an 
optimal size when the sum of the opportunity cost of holding reserves and the 
adjustment cost in case of depletion is minimised. Research based on that model 
suggests that some Asian economies have accumulated reserves beyond optimal 
levels. Reserves also seem high relative to traditional measures, such as months of 
imports and the quantity of debt to mature within one year. Although those models 
and measures might not take sufficient account of central banks’ high degree of risk 
aversion, the marginal benefits from accumulating additional reserves do seem to be 
diminishing. 
  Financial costs related to the reserve build-up might also be rising due to increased 
foreign exchange exposures and risks of unfavourable interest rate differentials. 
First, massive sterilised intervention could worsen the consolidated financial position 
of central banks and governments. Second, the accumulation of huge foreign 
reserves combined with rigid exchange rate management might lead local firms into 
unhedged foreign currency exposures and thereby increase their financial 
vulnerabilities. Third, the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is made at the 
expense of alternative investment opportunities. Indeed, central banks are currently 
considering alternative uses for parts of their large reserve holdings.
12 
                                                  
11  Large-scale intervention in one direction might also conflict with IMF Article IV. 
12   Korea is planning to hand over between $10 billion and $20 billion of its foreign exchange reserves to private 
fund managers. Taiwan (China) is considering the financing of local corporations’ purchases of machinery and 
the licensing of intellectual property rights. Thailand might use $7 billion to repay foreign debt accumulated by 
government agencies and state enterprises. And China has invested $45 billion to shore up the balance 
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  Continued intervention might eventually lead to a need for a greater, and potentially 
more abrupt, adjustment of exchange rates. In that event, the authorities intervening 
in pursuit of short-term stability might foster instability in the long run. 
  If monetary policy is used inadvertently to restrain domestic currency appreciation, 
resource allocations could become distorted, particularly in the allocation of capital 
between tradable and non-tradable sectors. If the exchange rate target proves to be 
non-viable, drastic changes in the exchange rate could require difficult reallocations 
of resources.  
Complexities posed by the coincidence of adjustment problems 
Integrating China and India into the global economy is made more complex by the presence 
of large external imbalances around the world. Conversely, adjustment of such external 
imbalances is influenced by policy choices and developments in China, India and elsewhere 
in Asia. 
The adjustment of the US external balance requires that the rest of the world (in the 
aggregate) import relatively more from the United States, or export relatively less to it, or 
both. Although the current account implications of globally integrating China and India are 
unclear at this point, the resulting shifts over time in the trade of manufactured goods and 
tradable services will surely require adjustment across sectors within many countries. The 
need to adjust simultaneously may alter the distribution of the needed changes around the 
world. The magnitude of the combined forces driving adjustment may create even larger 
burdens. 
Exchange rate policies in Asia and the accompanying reserve accumulation have important 
potential consequences for the adjustment process in Asia and in other regions. One 
question is whether the capital outflow resulting from intervention restrains domestic 
investment in the Asian region and whether that capital could and should be put to productive 
use in the domestic economies.
13 The counterpart capital inflow to the United States permits 
increased investment or lower saving and provides financing for a widening of the US current 
account deficit; the inflow thus delays and perhaps exacerbates the ultimate adjustment of 
external imbalances. The consequences of delayed adjustment are unclear: it permits the 
imbalances to widen further but may also promote a more gradual adjustment that avoids 
overshooting and financial sector disruption and turmoil.  
Another question is whether the capital outflow from Asia inhibits the development of 
domestic capital markets while helping to deepen the US bond market. If capital markets are 
efficient, then funds should respond to relative (risk-adjusted) interest rate differentials. 
However, the desire of Asian investors to invest in low-risk alternatives may create a bias in 
favour of US assets that, in turn, inhibits the development of their own capital markets. 
If, instead, purchases of US debt by Asian central banks are reduced, the dollar would 
weaken and US long-term interest rates would increase, reducing US absorption and 
contributing to some adjustment of the US current account. The size and speed of such 
adjustment would hinge on the relative size of income elasticities and growth rates in the 
United States and its major trading partners, exchange rate elasticities of exports and 
imports, and private investors’ perception of the current account deficit that can be 
sustainably financed by private flows to the United States. As for equity markets, Asian 
investors could reposition their portfolios in favour of domestic assets to reduce their direct 
                                                  
13  If an important counterpart to the reserve accumulation consists of FDI inflows (as in China), this argument 
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exposure to exchange rate risk. Whether they would move into fixed rate assets or equities is 
more uncertain, as a large share of earnings obtained by Asian firms quoted in the Asian 
markets is derived from exports to the United States.  
4. Policy  involvement 
The ultimate outcome of the external adjustment process will be some rebalancing of 
domestic absorption accompanied by changes in real exchange rates. Similarly, the ultimate 
outcome of the integration of China and India into the global economy will require a shifting 
of resources within economies according to comparative advantage. The role for public 
policy is to facilitate those processes.  
The authorities in major economic regions disagree significantly about the role public policy 
should play. The official position in the United States inclines towards allowing the market to 
resolve the issues, including determining the pace at which the dollar might depreciate. Many 
Asian countries are actively using official foreign exchange intervention (and subsequent 
investment of reserve assets) to prevent the dollar from depreciating against their own 
currencies. A third approach can be identified among the continental Europeans, who fear 
that an adjustment relying mainly on a lower real effective exchange rate for the dollar might 
prove disorderly, might require unrealistically large exchange rate movements and would 
spread the burden of adjustment unevenly. They feel most strongly that fiscal policies in 
deficit countries can be used to good effect. Without prejudice to any of these positions, the 
rest of this note reviews the role for policy. 
The sequencing of the desired policy actions is also open to debate. In some regions, policy 
actions should arguably be implemented as soon as possible, as delay may allow a bigger 
build-up of imbalances and an increased risk of outcomes that are harder to control. In other 
regions, the high costs of adjustment (perhaps because of weak financial systems) suggest 
the need for some trade-off in timing. There are also policy differences among authorities of 
the major regions concerning timing. Many Asian governments have indicated a willingness 
to embrace market-driven exchange rates in the medium term, even if they are resisting 
market pressures at present. A major policy issue, therefore, concerns their proposed 
strategy for exit from present policy choices, including scaling back exchange market 
intervention, modifying exchange rate regimes and liberalising capital accounts.  
Before considering the advantages and disadvantages of individual policies, it should be 
noted that a combination of developments might yield a favourable outcome. In particular, a 
fiscal tightening in the United States would generate an initial contraction in US domestic 
demand. Combined with a depreciation of the dollar against currencies that, to date, have not 
yet adjusted against the dollar, lower US demand could lead to a large and durable reduction 
in the US trade and current account deficits. The cost to output growth in individual countries 
would vary, depending on monetary and other policy responses. In such a scenario, 
unwanted adjustments in US and global long-term interest rates stemming from lower 
purchases of US securities by foreign central banks might be offset by a reduced supply of 
US government bonds. 
The approach taken below begins by identifying fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies 
in the United States, Europe and Asia that would seem to contribute best to facilitating the 
adjustments. For each policy, certain constraints are identified, the most common being 
conflicts with the pursuit of domestic objectives such as price stability and full employment. 
The discussion concludes by looking at the potential role for structural policies. Such policies 
are perhaps the most important in facilitating the integration of China and India into the global 
economy, but they are also those farthest removed from the principal areas of responsibility 
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Fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies 
The United States can achieve the necessary reduction in the ratio of domestic absorption to 
output through several channels, including a tightening of fiscal policy and an exogenous 
increase in private saving rates. Either of those channels would increase national saving. 
External adjustment in the United States that maintains output close to potential entails both 
reductions in absorption and market-induced shifts in expenditure from foreign goods to 
domestic goods. In addition, the composition of production at full capacity within the US 
economy must shift towards traded goods and services and away from home goods.  
An essential ingredient in the US adjustment process is a change in real exchange rates. As 
part of the adjustment, Japan and other Asian countries could moderate their intervention 
policies and purchases of US securities, remove restrictions on capital flows and allow 
greater nominal exchange rate flexibility. Their current actions are preventing exchange rate 
signals from coming through. In addition, lower longer-term interest rates in the United States 
are preventing a contraction of US absorption. However, the risks of an abrupt modification 
of exchange rate policies for countries with appreciating currencies suggest that 
“intermediate” regimes, such as adoption of a basket, a wider band or a crawling peg, could 
be considered. 
To date, many authorities outside Asia have let their currencies float. Generally speaking, 
there has been no intervention and no overt response from monetary policy. In the light of 
the Asian interventions, this has been associated with only a moderate decline in the 
effective value of the dollar to date but some quite sharp movements in a number of bilateral 
rates. One possibility is that countries with strengthening currencies, feeling themselves 
unfairly discomforted, might be tempted to act like their Asian counterparts. This would in 
itself further impede the adjustment process.  
Other things equal, countries with unsustainable external deficits ought to take steps to raise 
national saving, and those with unsustainable surpluses should increase domestic 
absorption. One effective way to pursue those goals is through fiscal policy. In principle, 
countries with twin deficits, like the United States, should practise fiscal restraint. Countries 
with external surpluses (notably the NIEs and Japan) might consider fiscal expansion. 
Unfortunately, fiscal policy initiatives currently face some practical constraints. In Japan, the 
fiscal deficit and public debt ratios are already very high. In the rest of Asia, calls for fiscal 
stimulus to increase domestic absorption would be more welcome in some countries than in 
others. In the United States, there is a growing recognition that the current fiscal policy is 
unsustainable, but the timing of the required consolidation remains uncertain. 
In the euro area, the need and scope for fiscal or monetary policy measures is particularly 
difficult to judge. The current account position is close to balance and, given its mandate, the 
ECB cannot give precedence to external objectives. The use of fiscal policy in increasing 
domestic absorption in the euro area is impeded by the fact that the fiscal positions of 
several member countries are already in conflict with the provisions of the Stability and 
Growth Pact – they exceed either the flow constraint (level of deficit) or the stock constraint 
(ratio of debt to GDP) and, in some important cases, both. Moreover, the fiscal multiplier is 
likely to be low in the smaller European countries owing to a high propensity to import. The 
main contribution of the euro area may thus lie in the sphere of structural reforms that raise 
private demand or potential growth (see below). 
Another means of rebalancing domestic absorption would be through the use of policies to 
raise private sector saving rates in deficit countries and to lower them in surplus countries. In 
the United States, the household saving rate has drifted downwards. Unfortunately, what 
policy might do about this is not obvious; for example, tax incentives to save just tend to 
reallocate existing savings. In surplus countries, particularly in Asia, the goal would be to 
lower private saving. In Japan, the household saving rate has already fallen sharply, but the 
effect to date has been offset by the increase in corporate saving. Elsewhere in Asia, there 
already seems to be a growing recognition that household saving rates should decline. One BIS Papers No 50  49
 
 
means to this end has been government encouragement to the banking sector to provide 
loans for household consumption and housing. However, to date, such schemes have not 
met with much success. In the euro area, structural policies could raise business confidence 
and, via higher investment levels, lower corporate net saving. What is less clear is the impact 
on consumer saving propensities, since job losses and concerns about social programmes 
and state pensions could potentially undermine household confidence.  
The role of monetary policy during the external adjustment is to contribute to the overall 
achievement of macroeconomic stability in accordance with the objectives embedded in the 
statutes governing many central banks. The United States has a large external deficit and 
only moderate inflation. Given current levels of excess capacity as well as the low rate of 
expected inflation and the orderly pace of the dollar’s decline, monetary policy has remained 
accommodating. However, regardless of how the adjustment process unfolds, US monetary 
policy would play a key role. For example, monetary policy should be used to restrain 
domestic demand if an adjustment of external imbalances initiated by a change in exchange 
rates boosted demand for US goods above potential output and triggered inflationary 
pressures. Alternatively, if US fiscal policy or an exogenous change in the saving rate 
reduced domestic absorption, the appropriate response of monetary policy would be to ease 
(thereby lowering US interest rates and the exchange value of the dollar) to increase the 
demand for US-produced goods. 
In the euro area, monetary easing might be justified if reduced external demand results in 
lower inflation. In contrast, monetary policy in the surplus countries in Asia seems, at least for 
the time being, much less likely to be constrained by prospective inflation. In Japan, price 
changes are still negative, and nominal policy interest rates have hit the zero lower bound. 
Efforts at quantitative easing, while welcome, have thus far failed to be reflected in either 
broader monetary or credit aggregates. Elsewhere in Asia, particularly in China, concerns 
are beginning to mount that further easing of monetary and credit conditions could result in 
bubble-like symptoms: excessive credit growth, asset price increases and overinvestment. 
Using massive intervention to hold down the exchange rate in the face of market pressures 
does, in the first instance, provide increases in base money that would raise the risk of such 
an outcome. While sterilisation has thus far been the normal practice, and successful, the 
associated decline of longer-term rates globally could have encouraged speculative 
excesses in a number of jurisdictions. 
Structural policies 
Recognising that changes in the real exchange rate can also develop from wage and price 
adjustments raises the broader issue of structural policies. The first point to note is that 
countries confronted with the need for structural adjustments, whether in response to 
external imbalances or because of competition from newly emerging countries, may be 
tempted to find a protectionist solution. Protectionist policies, wherever they occur and 
whatever their form, are counterproductive, and should be strongly resisted.  
A number of other structural policies could facilitate domestic price and wage adjustments 
(which provide the incentives for sectoral reallocations) and the reallocations themselves. 
The United States is likely to face a considerable adjustment challenge; fortunately, it also 
has the most flexible economy. In Japan, the principal requirements would be to free service 
industries from stifling regulation that squeezes profits and to be more prepared to close 
insolvent companies in the tradable sectors. A major structural challenge will be in Europe. 
Better structural policies could address issues of labour market inflexibility, lack of 
competition in product markets and excessive government regulation.  
In the NIEs and ASEAN, the strengthening of banking systems and the restructuring (or 
closing) of overindebted and loss-making firms are beneficial in themselves and would also 
facilitate the necessary reallocations. In addition, the development of domestic bond markets 
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mismatches. In China, reform of the corporate governance practices of state-owned 
enterprises and commercial banks could improve economic efficiency and potential growth. 
China’s plans to liberalise private capital outflows, in tandem with ongoing structural reforms 
and financial liberalisation, should help strengthen the financial system and facilitate the 
eventual adoption of a more flexible exchange rate regime. 
Looking further ahead, the emphasis on exports as a driver for growth and a catalyst for 
economic development in emerging Asia might need to be reconsidered. Although Asian 
policymakers might adopt export-oriented growth strategies for a number of reasons, such 
strategies could distort resource allocation if left in place too long, leading to overinvestment 
in preferentially treated sectors and underinvestment in others. In fact, questions have 
already been raised about the sustainability of investment in some sectors in China, where 
the growth of fixed investment exceeded 40% last year. On the other hand, the experience 
with growth strategies driven by domestic demand has, to date, not been encouraging. One 
reason for the lack of success appears to be the limited ability of immature financial markets 
to handle risks. That problem underlines the need for financial reforms stressed above. 